Professor Emeritus, Department of Finance and Department of Economics, University of Illinois
Visiting Scholar, Bank of Canada
Department of Finance webpage
Department of Economics webpage
Papers downloadable from Ideas/Repec
Papers downloadable from SSRN
Papers downloadable from Ideas/Repec
Papers downloadable from SSRN
FedNow and Faster Payments in the US ( 2024 ) Where’s the %*!@**^# Esc Key? ( 2024 )
Insurance, Weather and Financial Stability ( 2024 )
Literature Review and Framework for Institutional Investor Mobilization ( 2023 ) Digital Money and Central Bank Operations ( 2022 )
The Demand for Programmable Payments ( 2022 )
Security and Convenience of a Bank Digital Currency ( 2020 ) Statement on Evidence-Based Regulation and the Limits of Pilot Studies ( 2019 )
Eggs in One Basket: Security and Convenience of Digital Currencies ( 2019 )
Choice of Collateral Asset and the Cross-Border Effect of Automatic Stays ( 2016 ) Governance through Threat of Voice and Threat of Exit ( 2015 ) Time Consistency in Bank Regulation: Leverage and Bailout ( 2015 ) Law as a constraint on the 'lender of last resort': Central bank liquidity support for central counterparties ( 2015 )
Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture ( 2011 )
Toward Time-Consistency in Bank Regulation ( 2011 )
Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment ( 2013 version )
A theory of transactions privacy ( 2000 )
On the efficiency of cash settlement ( 1995 )
Universal Coalition-Proof Equilibrium: Concepts and Applications ( 1993 ) Liquidity Crises and the Market-Maker of Last Resort ( 2025 )
The Role of Pilot Studies in Financial Regulation ( 2025 )
Best Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery ( 2024 )
Grasping De(centralized) Fi(nance) through the Lens of Economic Theory ( 2022 ) Discussion of "Payments on Digital Platforms: Resiliency, Interoperability and Welfare" ( 2022 ) Liquidity provision during a pandemic ( 2021 ) Sources of Liquidity and Liquidity Shortages ( 2021 ) Illiquidity as a Signal ( 2020 ) Should the Central Bank Issue E-Money? ( 2020 ) Collateral, Rehypothecation and Efficiency ( 2019 ) The Threat of Privacy ( 2018 ) Are there Social Spillovers in Consumers’ Security Assessments of Payment Instruments? ( 2017 ) Law as a constraint on bailouts: Emergency support for central counterparties. ( 2016 ) Collateral chains and Incentives. ( 2016 ) Comment on “Bailouts, moral hazard, and banks' home bias for sovereign debt” by Gaetano
Gaballo and Ariel Zetlin-Jones. ( 2016 ) The Regulatory Challenge of Non-Bank Payment Institutions, and the Response of PSD2. ( 2016 ) Payment Systems in the US and Europe: Efficiency, Soundness and
Challenges. ( 2016 ) Identity Theft and Consumer Payment Choice: Does Security Really Matter? ( 2015 )
Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy. ( 2015 ) Private Payment Systems, Collateral, and Interest Rates. ( 2013 ) Comment on 'Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems' by Afonso and
Shin. ( 2011 ) Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. ( 2009 ) Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems. ( 2009 ) Credit and Identity Theft. ( 2008 ) Transferability, Finality and Debt Settlement. ( 2007 ) Comment on 'Who Should Act As Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model' by Repullo. ( 2006 ) Bank Consolidation and the Dynamics of Consumer Loan Interest Rates. ( 2005 ) Low Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. ( 2005 ) Money Is Privacy. ( 2005 ) Allocating Bank Regulatory Power: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. ( 2005 ) Comment on 'Competition and Financial Stability' by Allen and Gale. ( 2004 ) Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. ( 2004 ) Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement. ( 2003 ) The Economics of Payment Finality. ( 2002 ) Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins. ( 2002 ) Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects. ( 2001 ) Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. ( 2001 ) Economic Functions of Referrals and Referral Fees. ( 2001 ) The Design of Wholesale Payments Networks: The Importance of Incentives. ( 1999 ) Strategic Transmission of Information and Short-Term Commitment. ( 1999 ) Bank Deposit Rate Clustering: Theory and Empirical Evidence. ( 1999 ) Calibration of a Model of the Afternoon Effect in Cattle Auctions. ( 1999 ) Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. ( 1999 ) Uniform-Price Auctions with Variable Awards. ( 1998 ) Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts. ( 1998 ) Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices. ( 1998 ) Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Information. ( 1998 ) Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. ( 1998 ) One-Stop Shopping for Settlement Services: RESPA, Referral Fees, and Consumer Reaction. ( 1998 ) Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards. ( 1998 ) The Efficiency of Self Regulated Payments Systems: Leaming from the Suffolk System. ( 1996 ) Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy. ( 1995 ) Market Failure with Moral Hazard and Side Trading. ( 1995 ) Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor. ( 1994 ) The Economic Role of Foreclosures. ( 1994 ) Introducing Work Rules into Models of Wage-Employment Contracts. ( 1993 ) Non Existence and Inefficiency of Equilibria with American Options and Convertible Bonds. ( 1993 ) An Equilibrium Model of Quits Under Optimal Contracting. ( 1993 ) Exclusion and Moral Hazard: The Case of Identical Demand. ( 1993 ) The Existence and Characterization of Optimal Contracts on a Continuous State Space. ( 1993 ) The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Coalition-Proof Equilibrium in Infinite Games. ( 1992 ) Protecting the Winner: Second-Price Versus Oral Auctions. ( 1991 ) The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements. ( 1991 ) The Economic Role of Foreclosure Rules. ( 1991 ) Cooperative Arrangements for the Regulation of Banking by Banks. ( 1990 ) Default, Foreclosure and Strategic Renegotiation. ( 1989 ) The Use of Complicated Models as Explanations: A Re-examination of Williamson's Late 19th Century America. ( 1988 ) Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation. ( 1988 ) Two-Sided Uncertainty and Up-or-Out Contracts. ( 1988 ) A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features. ( 1988 ) Strategic Renegotiation. ( 1988 ) Erratum: The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. ( 1988 ) The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. ( 1986 ) Optimal Employment Contracts with Bankruptcy Constraints. ( 1985 ) Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information. ( 1985 ) Wage-Employment Contracts. ( 1983 ) The Solution of Linear Difference Models Under Rational Expectations. ( 1980 )Privacy Provision, Latency and the Role of Collateral ( 2020 ) Central Banks and Payment Systems: The Evolving Trade-off between Cost and Risk. ( 2016 ) Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). ( 2012 )Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of
Regulatory Architecture. ( 2011 ) Institutional Allocation of Bank Regulation: A Review. ( 2007 ) Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area. ( 2004 ) Modeling of Choices with Uncertain Preferences. ( 1994 ) An Agency Theory Approach to Slave Incentives. ( 1992 ) A Linear Programming Solution to the Slave Diet. ( 1992 ) Evolution of money and payment systems: private versus public institutions and the role of collateral (2015) The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? ( 2001 ) Semi-Stability in Game Theory: A Survey of Ugliness. ( 1992 ) Demandable Debt as the Optimal Banking Contract. ( 1988 ) Low blood lead level effects on intelligence: Can a dose-response curve be determined from the epidemiological data? Effective Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems: Maintaining financial plumbing Review of Roger Bowden's 'Statistical Games and Human Affairs'
The Fed and Its Shadow: A Historical View
Interview with Dr. Charles Kahn
Why Central Banks Shouldn't Ignore Stablecoins
Why “Paying in Rubles” May Prove Irrelevant Should the United States Issue a
Central Bank Digital Currency?
Lessons from Abroad
If stablecoins are money, they should be backed by reserves
Tokens vs. Accounts: Why the Distinction Still Matters
What Do Robocalls and Money Laundering Have in Common?
Standing Repo Facilities, Then and Now Are Banks Special? A Fintech Perspective
Center for Business and Public Policy, University of Illinois College of Business, blog postings 